The strategic planning of the Great Powers prior to 1914 has been a topic of continual fascination to historians for both military and non-military reasons. On the one hand, there has been the natural interest of the military writer in the operational, tactical and logistical contents of these plans and in the extent to which they anticipated the testing strategical conditions of the First World War itself. On the other hand, an equally intense concern has been shown by the student of politics in the broader, non-technical aspects of military planning: how far, for example, did the plans of the various General Staffs restrict their government's freedom of action and, to that extent, encroach upon the decision-making domain of the civilians? How far did they reflect the prevailing "unspoken assumptions" 3 about a country's foreign policy, the protection of national interests, and the nature of international relations and political morality? How far, indeed, were they actually responsible for the outbreak of that catastrophic conflict in the summer of 1914? It is precisely because this topic has always possessed both a military and a political aspect (frequently hard to disentangle, as much of what follows will show) that it has traditionally attracted so large an amount of historical attention. This traditional interest in the pre-war plans has been intensified in recent years as a consequence of the great controversy which has been raging since 1961 over Professor Fritz Fischer's interpretation of the origins of the First World War -for, in the allocation to Germany of the major responsibility for the outbreak of that conflict, Fischer and his school have paid particular attention to the rôle of the "military party" in Berlin. According to this interpretation, the sheer influence of military as opposed to civilian values and powers was a noted characteristic of Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany. The Kaiser was commander-in-chief de facto and not only, as in Britain, de jure. A primitive form of "military-industrial complex" had stoked up and exploited arms races to satisfy the needs of the vast armaments industry and to divert public attention from domestic political questions. Leading figures around the Kaiser were seeking an excuse to go to war from the controversial "Kriegsrat" of December 1912 onwards. A vigorous fulfilment of Germany's military alliance obligations to Austria-Hungary was regarded as axiomatic. Most important of all for our purposes, the Germans had only one war-plan, that created by Count von Schlieffen in 1905 and later modified by his successor as Chief of General Staff, the younger Moltke: it was a plan which was so inflexible that it meant going to war as soon as Russia even mobilised; which threatened the overthrow of France as its first major aim, although that power might not be directly involved in the conflict; and which involved a clear transgression of the territorial rights of those neutral neighbours, Belgium and Luxembourg. With such aggressive forces at hand in Berlin, and with such an irresponsible operational plan to hand, it was scarcely surprising that what had begun as a quarrel in the Balkans should have escalated into a conflict involving almost all of the Great Powers 4 .
Critics of the Fischer school have not only sought to dispute the validity of the interpretation which it has placed upon German policy itself but -and this is the obvious riposte to the claim that one power or person was responsible for an historical act -they have also argued that the outbreak of the war cannot be fully understood by looking merely at one of the players in the game. The policies, aims and decisions of the other participants deserve equal scrutiny, if a fair overall picture is to be drawn. When this is done, they claim, it will be seen that Germany was not alone in 1914 in containing elements who looked forward to war or in possessing inflexible and ambitious war plans. The French General Staff, thirsting to regain Alsace-Lorraine, was only with difficulty restrained from invading Belgium itself as a flank move against Germany if war broke out. The Russians possibly possessed the most inflexible plan of all, and their inability to mobilise separately against Austria-Hungary proved to be one of the most fateful errors of the July crisis. In Vienna, too, there existed both the ambition to engage in a war and the military plans to implement that ambition. Even Great Britain had, as a consequence of her staff discussions with France 1905 and , become drawn into a system of military checks and obligations which no one power alone could control. Should any of these states decide upon war in order to achieve its aims, it was unlikely that the others could keep out. Militarism, and military planning, had set up the European states like a row of dominoes; and it only needed one to fall to bring all the rest to the ground s .
Quite apart from this present controversy, with all its political and ideological overtones, there also exists an interest in the operational planning of the Great Powers in the few decades before 1914 from what might be termed the "military-institutional" point of view; for this was the first time in a period of peace that the major nationstates developed war plans in any systematic way. Compared with the elaborate staff organisations which evolved during and after the Second World War 6 , their predecessors no doubt appear primitive but the fact remains that they had grown up remarkably swiftly. That this creation and expansion of military and naval staffs took place in the latter half of the 19 th century can be attributed to a number of general causes, the most important being: a) The overall growth in the size of bureaucracies and governmental structures, this itself being a reflection of the increasing complexity of Western society as it underwent the processes of industrialisation and modernisation, and also a reflection of the desire of politicians and public to see more efficient organisations of state replacing ramshackle bodies often established centuries earlier 7 .
b) The increasing pace of technological invention and change in both armies and navies throughout the nineteenth century, which was a further consequence of the "Unbound Prometheus" 8 -the unstoppable and often unforeseen interaction of technological breakthroughs which occurred once the Industrial Revolution had got under way. New weapons, new forms of propulsion, new methods of communicating information, all had military repercussions; and armies and navies had either to keep in touch with such developments or to suffer the consequences of their conservatism when they encountered opponents using more advanced techniques and weapons of war. In addition, the growth of a "military-industrial complex" (especially with regard to shipbuilding) provided both a built-in mechanism for the creation of newer and more powerful weapons, and the economic and political forces to urge their development 9 .
c) The increasing complexity of warfare in a more general sense as those further consequences of the Industrial Revolution -mass production, vastly improved transport systems, and the more efficient organisation and deployment of vast armiesmade their impact. In an age where armies were beginning to total millions (including reservists and conscripts without much knowledge of military life), where railways were transforming all previous concepts of mobility, and where logistical preparations for a campaign could no longer rely upon the age-old system of living off the area in which the troops were billeted, organisation and planning became more exalted than ever before in the armed services. It was obviously crucial to control these huge war machines and to give them a direction. d) As a final consequence of all these developments, armies and navies were forced nolens volens to become more professional, that is, to contain and recruit officers who knew foreign languages, who possessed the organisational ability to create and control a railway or ammunition supply system, who were well acquainted with technological innovations and who could study and assimilate the latest technical and strategical writings. Improved educational qualifications upon entry and increased training of staff officers became the hallmark of late-nineteenth-century armed services 10 ; and, in all this, the dominant role now being played by the "expert" was but a mirror of trends which were also in evidence in the foreign and colonial ministries, educational departments, commercial and financial offices and virtually all other sectors of government and administration 11 .
But the most important short-term impetus to the formation of General Staffs and the development of operational planning in the later nineteenth century was the undoubted success of the Prussian military system in the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870/71, for these conflicts provided what seemed to be near-perfect examples of the way in which war should be conducted. Universal military service, and the planned deployment of a vast number of reservists in the front line, became the norm in almost all European armies. Moltke's clever use of the German railway network to transport and supply his large armies produced great admiration -and emulationin foreign states. And, in a similar fashion, the Prussian General Staff, the "brains" behind this new military system, became the model for other powers to copy; some countries, such as Japan, Turkey and certain Latin American states, going so far as to invite the Germans to help reorganise their entire military establishments. Even Great Britain and the United States, who, being insular, "liberal" states where the army's place was comparatively low in political terms, had resisted this trend for a while, were forced by later circumstances -Britain by the pressures upon her world-wide empire at the close of the 19 Λ century, the United States by the SpanishAmerican War -to follow suit. The frequency of imperial collisions and the growth of alliances and ententes between the Great Powers simply accentuated the desire to be prepared for war and to have an effective strategy against likely opponents. What we are examining here, in other words, are the early stages of something which has become one of the most important functions of the defence forces of every country nowadays: pre-war planning. For a combination of military and non-military reasons, therefore, there has grown up an extensive historiography upon the war plans of the Great Powers before 1914. However, a great deal of the earlier writing upon this topic was based either upon conjecture or upon incomplete knowledge, usually as a consequence of the selective revelations about pre-war plans in the official naval and military histories produced by the major participants of the First World War after 1919. Even today there is still a great amount that is unknown, but sufficient investigation has been carried out in recent years, thanks to the opening of numerous archives and private papers, to clear up many mysteries and to permit us to come to reasonably firm conclusions about a large number of the more significant aspects of the war planning of the Great Powers. It is the intention of this article to report upon the most important of these contributions and, at the same time, to suggest what those conclusions might be by studying our topic in the form of a comparative analysis. In so doing, it will be possible not only to see the contrasts and similarities between the operational planning of the various countries from the military-institutional point of view; but it will also cover that complaint made by the critics of the Fischer interpretation, namely, that by omitting any significant comparative element, it has taken the actions of the German government in 1914 out of its full international context. To ensure as wide an approach as possible, this survey will examine not only the recent literature upon war planning in Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France and Great Britain, but also that in two non-European countries, the United States of America and Japan.
It may at first sight appear surprising that the country whose operational plans have been examined in greatest detail has been Great Britain, which was, due to geographical position and historical tradition, perhaps less obliged than most of her rivals to prepare for a great military campaign, and was therefore relatively late in creating army and naval staffs. In the Austro-Hungarian case the records have been available for decades and a large amount of literature was produced in the inter-war years, including reliable official histories and Conrad's memoirs, full of documentation; but N. Stone has written two important pieces on Vienna's military plans, to which can be added Ritter's article noted above, Halpern's very useful survey of the naval policy and F. R. Bridge's references to military policy in his new book upon AustroHungarian foreign policy 51 . Nevertheless, this is not much to set alongside the many works upon British, American and German planning. Scholars interested in the operations plans of Japan before 1914 will discover that the problem of adequate coverage of this topic -which has been relatively neglected compared with the attention given to Japan's policies before the Second World Waris compounded by the problem of language. A fair number of works in Japanese, including official military and naval histories, do exist and a synopsis of their findings, either in the form of a book or a lengthy article, would be warmly welcomed not only by the present author but by many others untrained in the Japanese language.
As it is, details of Japanese strategic planning have to be picked up chiefly from works dealing primarily with foreign policy, such as those by What conclusions, then, may be drawn from this flood of recent writings regarding the most important questions, military and political, which historians have posed about the pre-war plans of the Great Powers? From the purely military point of view, the greatest interest has been concentrated upon how coherent and logical a national strategy has been; that is to say, what degree of ambivalence and/or flexibility was contained in the planning, and how effectively did the two armed services cooperate in pursuit of the defined major objective? How effectively was cooperation instituted with one's allies, and what additional problems did this give rise to? How successful and realistic were the plans as a whole, when we consider them retrospectively? To what extent were the actual fighting conditions of 1914/18 anticipated and prepared for? It is a rare event to discover complete coherence and single-mindedness in any Great Power's contingency planning, if only because it is likely to have more than one potential area of danger in a world where other nation-states are protecting and enhancing their "natural interests"; strategical ambivalence is therefore the normal situation for all but a few countries, yet if one's armed forces are divided to meet these various threats, concentration of power is lost and one runs the grave risk of being beaten en detail. The United States, for example, although well clear of the European alliance system, was constantly torn between its Pacific interests (out of a fear of Japan) and its Atlantic interests (out of a fear of Germany), particularly at a time when no isthmian canal existed to shorten the journey for warships between one theatre and the other. The logical solution, as the American government finally admitted in 1916, was to be strong in both oceans 60 -but no other state was wealthy enough to be able to implement such a neat solution to its problems. Great Britain, all too aware of a declining rather than a growing national strength, provides us with a classic example of strategical ambivalence, where eventually one aspect had to be sacrificed at the expense of the other. Since the time of the Tudors, the British "Janus" looked both to the outside world, where it was building up an enormous and profitable empire, and to Europe, where it possessed a permanent interest in seeing that no one country dominated the continent 61 . For most of the 19 th century the prospect of a dislocation in the European balance of power had not seriously existed; after 1905, it appeared to certain Britons to be very likely indeed and had to take priority in their calculations. But this shift from an essentially maritime to an essentially continental strategy was not effected without a great degree of bitterness. Japan, another offshore island state, was equally torn between the army's preparation for a land war against Russia and the navy's preparation for what would be an essentially maritime war against the United States 62 .
The continental European states, too, suffered from an ambivalence which affected their war planning. Austria-Hungary might recognise in Russia her most formidable foe; but this did not curb that passionate desire to deal with Serbia as soon as a war broke out. The despatch by Conrad of the famous B-Staffel (the reinforcing army), firstly to the Serbian front, and then a week later to the Russian front illustrates the dangers inherent in not firmly resolving such an ambivalence beforehand 63 . In the German case, the dilemma seemed to be resolved by the adoption of Schlieffen's daring scheme; yet this placing of all the German eggs in the basket of a hoped-for success in the west not only gave the German strategy an alarming rigidity of response to international crises, but also harmed her image in the eyes of the world and brought her two additional foes in the shape of Belgium and Britain as a result of the further decision (by the younger Moltke) that Liège had to be seized virtually as soon as hostilities had broken out. This alteration, which rendered impossible Schlieffen's (perhaps illusory?) hope that the French might be goaded into invading Belgium first, was, like the decision to strengthen the Eastern Front in 1914, an indication that the Germans were still acutely conscious of their country's strategical dilemma. Russia's ambivalence was somewhat similar to that of the Central Powers: a wavering between a concentration upon the minor enemy, whom she would like to defeat first, and a need to defend herself against the major enemy, whose movements at the outbreak of war were uncertain. As the events of 1914 showed, St. Petersburg had about as much success in reconciling these two military aims as Berlin and Vienna. Finally, the French, who had for centuries suffered as a consequence of divided military objects (against the Low Countries, against Spain, against the German states, against England) for once possessed a relatively unambiguous strategy after 1904/1905 as a result of the entente cordiale; for the arrangement with Britain not only removed the possibility of war with that country which had been strong until 1903 or so, but it also reinforced the Italian desire to abandon the Triple Alliance and thus permitted France to concentrate upon the defence of her north-eastern frontier.
One subsidiary aspect of this vital problem of strategical coherence relates to the harmonisation of the aims of the military and naval branches of a country's defence forces. A state which was basically continental, such as Russia and Austria-Hungary, had little trouble in this respect, for the navy served simply as an adjunct to the army; France, too, was similarly placed by 1914, with her navy being required chiefly to secure the lines of communication through the Mediterranean. For the United States in a period of isolationism, in contrast, the navy was all-important and the army was more or less a home-defence force 64 . However, prolonged inter-service dissensions did break out in Germany, where Tirpitz and the Admiralty Staff sought in vain to break free from the strategical dominance of the General Staff; in Japan, where, as already mentioned, the army and the navy prepared for war against different prospective enemies; and in Great Britain, where the Royal Navy struggled to maintain its traditional supremacy within the armed services at a time when circumstances suggested that only by adopting the army's scheme for a "continental commitment" could the independence of France and the Low Countries be preserved. It is, then, perhaps not surprising that it was in Great Britain that the furthest steps were taken to create an organisation (the CID) whose task it was to ensure that the strategies of the army and the navy were integrated, since both sought primacy for their own operational schemes. Even here, no full harmony was achieved", but elsewhere the creation of genuinely "joint" planning bodies was far less advanced. Either, as was the case with the United States Joint Army and Navy Board, there was no pressing need to give teeth to a (nominally) central organisation; or, as was the case with Japan, the two services worked alone; or, as was the case with Russia, Austria-Hungary and France (despite the latter's formal Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale), one service was clearly unchallenged in its primacy; or, as was the case with Germany, the Kaiser's concern about his own privileges not only prevented the emergence of some equivalent to the CID or indeed any Cabinet-style of collective government but also ensured the perpetuation of rivalries within each service, e. g. between the Reichsmarineamt, the Admiralstab and the Marine-Kabinett. "Who rules in Berlin?", Berchtold's famous question of 31st July, 1914, about the contradictory messages emanating from the military and civilian wings of the German government, was one which had been asked many times before. Coordination between allies was an even more difficult task to implement. The lack of true strategical harmony between Moltke and Conrad has been widely acknowledged -and the same disharmony occurred, incidentally, in the Austro-German naval arrangements in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war -but other examples emerge from the entente side. Britain and Russia had never really made preparations to cooperate at all, and only in the summer of 1914 were tentative steps taken in the naval sphere. Britain and Japan, drifting apart since 1906 or so, were scarcely more prepared to institute a joint strategy and the Japanese decision to enter the war in late August, 1914, was not regarded without misgivings in London 66 .
As for Britain and France, the political scruples of the Liberal government ruled out any fixed promises of support, with the result that, although Joffre could regard British help as likely if Germany made an aggressive move westwards, he could never count with certainty upon the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Even the Franco-Russian military alliance was hardly of an intimate nature, joint planning being chiefly discussed at very formal staff meetings each year, with the two General Staffs keeping many aspects of their own plans to themselves. What held them together was the mutual fear of Germany; and the blunt fact that the Schlieffen Plan (whose general outlines were known in Paris and St. Petersburg) dictated that the German riposte to a conflict with Russia was most likely to be an assault upon France. Moreover, military arrangements between allies often added "frictions", to use a term of Clausewitz', to the already large problems facing the General Staffs. The French were always pressing for a Russian promise to advance before the latter's army was likely to be ready; Conrad demanded that Moltke agree to a swift German advance eastwards when Berlin's preferred strategy was to stay on the defensive in that theatre; Moltke, likewise, demanded an Austro-Hungarian pledge to assault Russia when Vienna wished to concentrate upon Serbia. Allies, in other words, might bring aid but they also brought further problems and uncertainties. With regard to retrospective consideration of how successful and realistic, militarily speaking, the pre-war planning of the Great Powers turned out to be, the evidence suggests that the "experts" almost completely failed to anticipate the actual fighting conditions, and also forgot that in any case no country was likely to surrender quickly even if badly mauled in the field (which was what all the planners hoped for) because of the existence of allies who might come to their aid 67 . This seems all the more discreditable when one realises that there were in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries not one, but two, quite different projections of the course of future wars. On the one hand, there was the image of the elder Moltke's three swift campaigns against Denmark, Austria and France, and the belief that, since railways had vastly increased mobility and since modern industrialised states could efficiently mobilise millions of men, a war would be decided within weeks, if not days, of its opening. On the other hand, there was the image of the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War, and the publication of such works as Ivan S. Bloch's Modern Weapons and Modern War, which suggested that future conflicts between the Great Powers would be long, drawn-out tests of endurance, where the defence would have the advantage over the offence and where the fighting would go on until one or both sides collapsed in economic ruin or recognised the stalemate for what it was. Why, then, did the General Staffs plump so wholeheartedly for the first of these alternative scenarios, and disregard the second? Military considerations alone cannot fully explain this choice; but the fact remains that in so many countries the planners abandoned a strategy which appears in retrospect to have been more realistic. The elder Moltke's scheme for a defensive stand against France and a limited offensive against Russia not only seems, in view of the French disasters in AlsaceLorraine and the disorganised state of the Russian army in 1914, to have had a better chance of success than a westward strike, but it would also have taken from Germany's shoulders the onus of having attacked Belgium and possibly have kept Britain neutral. The French defensive strategy of the post-1871 period was also superior to Joffre's rush towards the Rhine, which simply played into the German hands. And would not the Russians have done better to have desisted from advancing into East Prussia?; and the Austro-Hungarians from invading Galicia? One wonders, in addition, whether the British Cabinet would have been so willing to support their General Staff's strategy had they possessed any premonition that the original Expeditionary Force would be virtually wiped out by the Spring of 1915. However, the adoption by the Great Powers of a defensive strategy would not only have contradicted what the generals believed to be those key military characteristics of speed and concentration of force, but they would also have indicated greater moderation in national objectives, a willingness to wait upon rather than to instigate events, and less conviction in the idea of an "all or nothing" war which was so common in the summer of 1914.
Since this leads us from the military to the political aspects of our topic, it will be as well to consider now the chief questions which have been asked about the rôle of war planning in the latter sphere. The first, and most important, aspect has always been concerned with the extent to which operational planning factors encroached upon the freedom of action of the central government itself, either by affecting its foreign policy or by actually provoking a decision for war. Were the military alliances a cause of the First World War? Did mobilisation mean war rather than a piece of diplomatic "bluff"? Did railway-timetabling replace decision-making by human beings at the high point of the 1914 crisis? And how far were the fears of that old Liberal, Campbell-Bannerman, justified, when he argued that if General Staffs were created they would plan wars against other states and then probably ensure that their plans were realised 68 ? The crucial topic of the proper balance in civil-military relations is involved in all of these questions, but it would be as well at the outset to remember that the constitutional position differed from country to country. The ability of the soldier to influence or even dictate policy was far less in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and also in France, than it was in the three conservative monarchies of Central and Eastern Europe and in Japan, which had copied so much of the Bismarckian constitution of 1871. By examining the constitutions alone, we can obtain significant insights into the extent of the military influence from one country to the next.
That said, however, it is clear that the military factor encroached upon the civilian in all these countries, with only the United States government in 1914 still able to regard its military planners as working out academic contingency schemes. Even the "non-commital" Anglo-French staff talks turned out to have implications which gave them a political dimension, as the critics of Grey's entente policy had forecast all along. In the first place, they made for an increasingly heavy moral commitment on Britain's part to support France in the event of war, not only because their respective General Staffs had worked so closely together but also because the November 1912 agreement had promised joint consultations between the governments when "something threatened the general peace"; and while this did not legally bind London to the French, it compromised a truly neutral position -and, of course, completely ruled out the idea of Britain fighting on Germany's side, which by 1914 nobody thought possible. Furthermore, the Anglo-French naval understanding of 1912 bound the British in a much more concrete manner, for they accepted that it was as a result of this that the French had left their Channel coast undefended by sea; thus, on Aug. 2nd, 1914, before any decision for war against Germany, the British Cabinet agreed with Grey's wish to assume responsibility for the defence of France's northern coastline. Even at this point neither France nor Germany -nor, for that matter, Grey and Asquith -were absolutely certain of Britain's course of action, and it was more out of a sense of political and moral obligation to defend Belgium and the balance of power in Europe than as a consequence of some legallybinding military treaty with France that Cabinet and Parliament voted to enter war. The Anglo-French staff talks and the imposition of strategical unity by the CID in 1911 were more decisive in establishing what sort of war Britain would fight if she came in than the question of whether she was obliged to come in; but they certainly caused many politicians and officials to regard intervention as being very likely 69 . The same remarks might also be made about the Japanese decision to declare war, although in that case the casus foederis was less obvious and the Japanese leaders clearly did not regard their action as being purely a defensive one: the prospect of territorial expansion beckoned as well 70 .
If the voice of the military planners was not all-powerful in Japan and Britain, the same was true in France, where the government was determined neither to be the first to begin hostilities, nor to invade Belgium. On the other hand, it was also determined to fulfil its obligations to its Russian ally if the casus foederis occurred; yet even if the French had tried to wash their hands of that commitment, the Germans would not let them and on August 1st Berlin demanded not only French neutrality but also the occupation of some key border fortresses -which the German government calculated it would be impossible for Paris to agree to. In that sense, it was the exigencies of the German operations plan which brought France into the war even before her own alliance obligations did so. The case of Austria-Hungary is perhaps the most interesting of all from one point of view, for in Vienna it was the civilian element represented by Berchtold (himself under pressure from Berlin) which was pushing forward the military into a swifter beginning to hostilities than Conrad believed feasible. This is in no way to say that Conrad opposed the war -he had been anticipating it for years -but the diplomatic circumstances of late July appeared to favour action as soon as possible and Berchtold felt that Austria-Hungary's mobilisation schedules were far too slow, as did Bethmann and the German Foreign Office staff. Berchtold also provides a good example of the "militarised" civilian, one who was only too keen to see diplomacy replaced by armed conflict. As for the rôle of alliances in causing war, it was admittedly true that only with Berlin's support could Vienna hope to undertake an action which might lead to a war with Russia; but it was also highly probable that the Austro-German alliance had deterred the Russians from attacking their weaker rival in the Balkans many times in the past and was, therefore, a potential instrument for holding both Vienna and St. Petersburg in check, particularly under Bismarck. In 1914, however, Germany was unwilling to restrain, and Russia was unwilling to be deterred; and it is to the capitals of those two Powers that we must turn if we are to understand the key elements in the catastrophe. The relationship between the civilian and military wings of government at St. Petersburg in July 1914 was most complex. Undoubtedly, the existence of a military alliance with France made all the Russian leaders more willing to take risks than otherwise would have been the case -and the urgings of the French General Staff and the French ambassador, Paléologue, reinforced this consideration. Undoubtedly, too, no distinction can be detected within the Russian establishment about the anger felt at Austria-Hungary's aggressive reaction to Sarajevo and about the recognition that Russia would be obliged to defend Serbia. The real gulf emerged over the question of partial or general mobilisation. The Czar favoured the former because he hoped to keep Germany out of the war; Sazonov also favoured it at first because he thought it could be used as a warning to Vienna without alarming Berlin. When the Russian military leaders declared that a partial mobilisation would dislocate their plans, it appeared that this strategy of "bluff" had failed and that military incompetence and inflexibility had once again cramped the style of the civilians. Yet L. C. F. Turner puts all this in a new light by demonstrating not only that it could have been possible for Russia to institute partial mobilisation had the generals so wished, but also that Sazonov (who later changed his mind and urged full mobilisation upon the Czar) was mistaken in his earlier calculation because even partial mobilisation would have been sufficient to send the German war machine into action, due to the military terms of the Austro-German alliance and the inner logic of the Schlieffen Plan 71 . To this extent Turner, and many others before him, have been correct in regarding the Russian decision to mobilise at all as one of the most fateful acts in this drama. It is in Berlin that the climax of any analysis of the influence of war plans must be found, if only because it was there that the crucial relationship between "the sceptre and the sword" was most deranged, and because this imbalance had more far-reaching consequences than any other. Here again, we observe that common element of a government believing that it is obliged to support an ally, both in fulfilment of an international treaty and in defence of its national interests and honour. We also observe that tension between the diplomat, seeking to gain extra time, and the soldier, eager to ensure that his schedules run smoothly and countering any threat to them by use of "technical" arguments -witness Moltke's insistence on August 1st, 1914, that the army could not possibly go on the defensive in the west. But it is here that comparisons begin to falter and we see that German war planning was, in certain respects, unique. For it was only the German plan which involved an attack upon another Power (France), whether or not the latter wished to become involved in the war; it was only the German plan which contemplated the violation of neutral territory simply to satisfy military requirements; and -most important of all -it was only in the German plan that mobilisation meant war. It is this fact, quite apart from the debate instigated by the Fischer school about the political and economic aims of German policy, which makes Berlin the centre of the 1914 crisis in military terms as well; and which casts doubt upon the adequacy of Ritter's deploring of the "shortsightedness" of the Schlieffen Plan whilst declining to draw the logical conclusions from that judgement.
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The British mobilisation of thé fleet in 1914, and preparations to despatch the expeditionary force, did not mean war; both measures could have been cancelled, and it was not until August 5th and 6th that the War Council and Cabinet respectively decided to give formal approval to the despatch of the BEF to France. The French efforts to be ready in time also did not mean war; and Joffre was firmly restrained from any premature rush across the frontier which would put France in the wrong. Austro-Hungarian mobilisation, too, did not mean a jump over the brink; the declaration of war on Serbia itself was all-decisive, and the generals were straining^ to meet a deadline set by the diplomats. Even in the Russian case, a distinction had been drawn from 1912 onwards between "the proclamation of mobilisation" and "the order for the opening of hostilities" 72 ; and, although the Russian General Staff j hoped and expected that the first would equal the second, there still existed the possibility of controlling events after mobilisation -and even for changing the general mobilisation back to partial mobilisation, as the Czar did late on July 29th. It is worth adding, for the sake of comparability, that the American and Japanese plans also had no inherent mechanism which would plunge them into war as soon as either of them mobilised.
But the German plan was of a different nature; for Schlieffen, in attempting to solve the dilemma of a two-front war, had pinned all hopes upon defeating France whilst the more backward Russia was still mobilising. A Russian mobilisation without the Powers going to war until, say, a month or so later would totally upset this scheme, for the Russian "steamroller" would then be in a position to invade East Prussia just as the bulk of the German army was moving against France -instead of six weeks later, as the German General Staff calculated! In other words, to preserve the integrity of this strategy Russian mobilisation had to mean a German declaration of war; and the pressure for such an instantaneous response became even greater when Moltke decided upon the necessity of a swift seizure of Liège. Thus, Germany was the only country which, so far as its own plans were concerned, drew no practical distinction between an act of "brinkmanship" and the opening of hostilities. Criticism of the entente statesmen for not realising this seems hardly fair, for it was surely difficult for them to conceive that that which existed in their countries had no place in Berlin's calculations; and it is only by special pleading that one can regard the Russian decision to mobilise as the most fateful step taken during the crisis -since it was fateful simply because of a German operations plan which demanded the immediate opening of hostilities as its consequence. It may be that the Great Powers would have gone to war over the Austro-Serb conflict even if Grey had managed to get diplomatic discussions under way whilst all sides stood mobilised; but the exigencies of the modified Schlieffen Plan, together with the policy formulated by the government in Berlin, precluded that possibility from ever being realised. Finally, there is the further evidence provided in Fischer's latest book, that not only did Bethmann Hollweg himself privately admit that Russian mobilisation "cannot be compared with those of the West European states", but also that the leadership in Berlin was only waiting for the news of a full mobilisation by Russia to give it the excuse to open up the war in the west. Thus, the quarrel between the sceptre and the sword on July 29th was solely concerned with conflicting views upon the reasons adequate enough to justify Germany's own offensive steps ; and the degree of mobilisation of the Russian army appears to have been less significant in military terms -for Moltke wanted to use its partial mobilisation as a reason for declaring war in any case -than in political terms -where the Chancellor feared that the Chief of General Staff's proposal might too clearly expose the government's policy to the suspicious Social Democrats at home and the British abroad 73 . A comparative study of the rôle of the war plans in 1914 does not shift 200 the focus of attention away from Berlin, in other words.
Was it, then, a "war by timetable" 74 ? Certainly not, as far as the British and French were concerned; even the latter's urgent pleas for a swift Russian mobilisation did not mean that war had to begin, for it was of course in the French interest to delay the outbreak of hostilities as long as possible, which was precisely why the German General Staff could not tolerate such a contingency. Moreover, when we examine those critical occasions in which railway timetables appeared to affect the course of events in Vienna and St. Petersburg, the evidence suggests that the soldiers were using false arguments to win over the civilians to their line of action: N. Stone has shown that it was not true for Conrad to state that the despatch of the B-Staffel troops to the Serbian front was irreversible, and L. C. F. Turner has shown that it was not true for the Russian General Staff to declare that partial mobilisation was impossible. Only in the German case did the planning take all alternative strategies out of the government's hand, and as soon as Russia had mobilised Bethmann Hollweg found himself reduced to being the diplomatic instrument of the Schlieffen Plan, his own concern being to present Germany's actions in the best possible light. Part of the answer to this has to be found in the failure of politicians and diplomats to control their General Staffs. Even Clausewitz had admitted that"The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense" because "policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument" 75 . Yet in 1914, in certain crucial cases, the relationship was reversed and military considerations were elevated to the primary position. Why did not the Russian government ensure that its army could carry out a partial mobilisation if that was required? And why, above all, did the German government not scrutinise more carefully all the implications which flowed from the adoption of Schlieffen's scheme? It is scarcely adequate to answer that the technicalities of modern warfare made such scrutiny impossible, for we have only to turn to Japan and Britain to see that this was not always so in other countries. As J. B. Crowley has shown, the genro (elder statesmen) were strong enough to insist that during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95 and the RussoJapanese War of 1904/06, "they would determine the national objectives during the hostilities, including, of course, strategic objectives"; and only in later years, interestingly enough, was the army's General Staff able to free its Manchurian policy from civilian control following a series of quarrels which look forward to the events of 1931, 1937 and 1941 76 . In Britain, civilian control was maintained to the end, as the famous CID meeting of 23rd August, 1911, showed. The host of questions put then to Admiral Wilson by such strong-minded, articulate and informed listeners as Churchill, Lloyd George, Haldane and Asquith quite undermined the impractical Admiralty plan to launch an amphibious assault on the German North Sea or Baltic coasts in the event of war with that country. Moreover, although the army's alternative plan, of sending the BEF to France, was agreed to be the more realistic of the two, Churchill and others had also challenged some of the General Staff's assumptions about the likely course of the land war in Belgium in its early stages 77 . It is true that the CID still had a long way to go if it was to become a true centre qf strategic planning, but that meeting and several others (the 1903/05 and 1907/08 invasion inquiries, the 1912 Mediterranean decision) provide examples of the way in which civilians could scrutinise plans if they so wished.
This conditional clause leads us to the other reason why the war plans played such a decisive rôle in 1914, namely, the blunt fact that they encapsulated not merely the strategical calculations of military "experts" but also many of the prevailing political assumptions of the establishments of the western world at that time. To begin with, there was that belief in the need to take firm action in the defence of national interests, regardless of what were considered to be the eccentric notions of liberals and pacifists about international arbitration. "My country, right or wrong" may have been coined by an American politician but it captures a much more widespread attitude. The Austro-Hungarian government regarded the Serbs as a grave threat to the Empire's autonomy and was determined not to tolerate any slight to its prestige; the Russian government, humiliated in the Bosnian crisis of 1908/09, was now resolved to protect its Balkan interests, if need be by force; the German government felt bound to Vienna, its only remaining ally, and entitled to prepare for action against its Franco-Russian foes; the French government could not let Russia be eliminated by the Central Powers; the British government, conscious of its historic interest in the European balance of power, could not let France and Belgium be overrun by a hostile Germany. In this connection, we should also recall the American determination to brook no transgression of the Monroe Doctrine, and the Japanese willingness to go to war over Korea and Manchuria. Each of the war plans, it is worth noting, reflected in general the respective Power's assumptions about its political, diplomatic, economic and moral interests. To ask for fundamentally different plans -say, British non-involvement on the continent, or Russian non-response while Serbia was being attacked by Austria-Hungary -is to ask for fundamentally different political attitudes, which is demanding a lot, given the temper of the times. One example among many of this national acceptance of facts which historians would now be very prone to question is the April 1913 meeting of the Reichshaushaltskommission, where clear indications were given by governmental spokesmen of the possibility of a German invasion of Belgium without any of the Reichstag representatives challenging the strategical need for such a measure and only a few of them timidly querying its political implications 78 . Little wonder that the German government had little difficulty in getting the support of the Social Democrats and others in July and August 1914, especially when it played up the Russian "danger", against which only the extreme Left would question the need to fight. But the military plans were also conditioned by background attitudes in another way, in that they reflected, through their inflexibility and demand for instant action, the mood of fatalism and determinism that was so strongly in evidence in the prevailing ideology. The Social-Darwinistic notions of a struggle for survival; the hyperpatriotism of the military men and the "militarised" civilians; the cultural pessimism of élites alarmed at developing threats both within and without; the disregard for the concepts of international law and morality; the dislike of compromise, and the desire for "total" solutions -is not all this to be witnessed in the war plans, giving them those characteristics which have appalled later critics? The French stress upon élan and cran as integral parts of the strategy of revanche, which alone explains the folly of the rush towards the Rhineland; the desire of the Russian General Staff to have a full-scale, and not just a partial war against the Teutonic foes which were frustrating its "mission" in the Balkans; the fatalism of Conrad and Berchtold that only by a great war would the question of the future of the Austro-Hungarian Empire be settled; and Captain Schroder's objections (in the German naval plan of 1897) to the "artifically constructed clauses of international law" 79 , an attitude which of course the whole Schlieffen Plan fully reflected, are all part of a mentality which goes far to explain features of the pre-war planning which otherwise appear bewildering. There were no defensive strategies, because they were not wanted; there were no alternatives, because 202 inflexibility was much in the mind as in the railway timetables; there were no schemes for stalemate and compromise, because a swift and absolute victory was what was demanded; and there was little civilian control over the military because very often they both had the same objectives and shared a common ideology. To put it another way, what the recent literature suggests upon a close reading is that the tensions which occurred between civilians and military in Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg and elsewhere following the Sarajevo assassination arose mainly out of a dispute over means, not ends. There is no doubt that the respective governments had generally failed to examine properly the means their General Staffs proposed to use in a crisis and were disturbed at the extent to which strategic exigencies curbed their freedom for diplomatic manoeuvre; but this, as we have argued, is an insufficient answer to our questions. Any proper inquiry into the war planning of the Great Powers in that period must in the end concentrate not merely upon the military technicalities but also upon the political and ideological assumptions of which they were an expression. Only then can one discover the real meaning behind those carefully-prepared, minutely-timetabled and inflexibly-conceived plans which took the Great Powers over the brink into war in the summer of 1914; and only then can one understand that such operational schemes, whatever we may think of them in retrospect, were the outward signs of far deeper and more alarming aspects of western society and thought as it marched for the most part cheerfully into a conflict which was eventually to undermine Europe's hitherto unchallenged position in world affairs. It might be objected here that what is so clearly written down in an operations plan can scarcely be regarded as "unspoken"; but, as J. Steinberg (footnote 47) has shown about the German plan to invade Holland and Belgium, the most significant fact is precisely the way in which certain political and moral judgements within these operational writings were simply taken for granted by their authors and their intended audience, both having a similar cast of mind. 
